Introduction
As a means of addressing climate change, energy efficiency 3 of residential buildings is becoming increasingly singled out by EU environmental policy. Residential buildings are particularly important to focus on, since, according to Eurostat, they account for around 25% of total energy consumption as well as around 20% of greenhouse gas emissions. EU directives such as the directives 2002/91/EC, 2010/31/EU, and 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and the Council set minimum standards for all countries of the European Union to improve energy efficiency in residential buildings. More importantly, specific goals are set for the years 2020 and 2030 (20% and 30% reduction in energy consumption compared to projections).
While there are common goals, different governments employ different tools in order to reach these target values. Moreover, energy efficiency levels differ vastly across European countries (Filippini et al. 2014) . This gives us the opportunity to study the effectiveness of various tools for increasing energy efficiency levels.
Former research has primarily focused on quantifying energy efficiency policies (Ó Broin et al (2015) , Filippini et al. (2014) ) or focused on the evaluation of only one energy policy instrument such as regulations (Levinson 2014; Levinson 2016) ). This, however, went along with a number of limitations such as homogenizing heterogeneous policy instruments, or excluding important policy instrument which are not quantifiable.
Therefore, we take on a different approach in order explore which factors of energy policy are effective and are able to explain differences in energy efficiency across European countries. By taking on an exploratory and mixed methods approach we shed some light on parts of energy efficiency policies which have earlier been neglected, such as district heating and carbon taxation.
Our analysis is divided into two parts, namely a quantitative and an exploratory qualitative part. In a first step, we use panel data techniques (LSDV) in order to explain residential building energy consumption (from 2000 till 2015) of European countries by a number of observable characteristics. Country dummy coefficients can be regarded as unexplained between-country-deviations from expected consumption levels (where the expectation is contingent on observable characteristics). In a subsequent qualitative analysis, based on the results of our quantitative analysis, we investigate energy efficiency policies (with respect to residential buildings) in selected countries by conducting expert interviews in these countries and examining official policy documents as well as statistics.
Besides evidence on the effectiveness of regulatory (building efficiency) standards, our exploratory hypothesis suggests the hypothesis that energy taxes and carbon taxation represent effective means of energy conservation.
Energy Efficiency in Residential Buildings
Literature on the effectiveness of energy policy instruments on energy efficiency is rather scarce. Differences in climatic conditions, levels of income and living area, etc. preclude any simple cross country comparison of energy consumption in the building sector. Some studies circumvent this problem by comparing regulatory standards of new buildings (Schild et. al, 2010) although this also greatly reduces the scope by excluding the great amount of existing buildings which make up most of the overall energy demand. Alternatively one may control for observable characteristics that are known to influence consumption levels. There are only two major studies which analyze and compare the effectiveness of energy policies on energy efficiency in residential buildings across different countries, namely by Filippini et al. (2014) and Ó Broin et al. (2015) . Therefore, we will focus mainly on these two studies and explain their approaches fairly detailed since our further analysis is based on these two studies.
The empirical analysis by Filipini et al. (2014) combines an energy demand model which includes climatic conditions, income levels and living area, with a so called frontier analysis. The authors generate six quantitative policy indicators within three main categories. There are (i) regulatory standards (e.g. u-values), (ii) financial/ fiscal incentives, and (iii) informative measures based on the cross country database on energy policies (MURE). This approach has two major limitations: firstly, quite distinct policy measures are treated as if they were identical. To give an example, subsidies for specific types of technologies and broader incentives such as energy taxation are put together in category (ii). Secondly, by simply counting the number of policies there are no weights which signify the relative impact of these measures (i.e. the indicator is equal to 1 if there are two or more regulatory standards in place that prescribe rules for buildings or heating within a country, and 0 otherwise). Many different kinds of standards fall within the precinct of this category. The authors recognize this problem when they state "This is arguably a relatively simplistic approach because [..] the measures are heterogeneous; hence, counting the number of measures introduced in each group could be imprecise" (Filippini et al., 2014, 78) . For example, Filippini et al (2014, 76, table I) list Sweden as one of the countries with relatively few regulatory standards. But as we will show below, the regulatory standards in Sweden should be seen as the strictest across Europe. In summary, the results suggest that regulatory standards and financial/ fiscal incentives affect energy consumption, whereas informative measures do not. These findings are in accordance with Feser & Runst (2016) who investigate why subsidized information campaigns for home owners do not seem to be effective in increasing the rate of energetic retrofits (and point toward lacking profitability and asymmetric information as reasons). Ó Broin et al. (2015) pursue a similar strategy as Filipini et al. (2014) but introduce a stronger quantitative element in generating the policy-indicators. The authors use a panel data set of 15 European countries for the time period of 1990 till 2010. They estimate the determinants of heating energy consumption. Instead of simply counting the number of different types of policies (Filipini et al., 2014; also Bertoldi and Mosconi, 2015) , Ó Broin et al. (2015) generate what they call a semi-quantitative index, whereby they apply different impact-weights to different policies in order to include a measure of effectiveness (and the effect size) for different policies. The policies recorded in the MURE-database are therefore divided into low, medium and high impact, which correspond to energy savings of 0.1%, 0.1-0.5%, and more than 0.5%. Accordingly, each policy is coded as 1, 10 or 20. The semi-quantitative approach thereby transforms a more or less informal expert consensus on the effectiveness of a policy by mapping tem onto the numbers 1, 10, or 20. The resulting semi-quantitative policy indicators also enter the empirical specification as lags (t-1 until t-7) in order to capture medium run effects. There are three policy categories -financial, informative and regulatory. The authors show that regulatory policies impart the greatest effect on energy consumption. In contrast to Filipini et al. (2014) , the results indicate a seven year delay in the effectiveness of informative measures. Information effect sizes are also relatively small. The authors suggest increased implementation of regulatory measures.
A semi-quantitative approach necessarily emphasizes similarities between heterogeneous policies in order to create a feasible number of categories. To be sure, any process of quantification faces this challenge as the counting of entities (variable values) within constructed categories (variables) always entails some degree of artificially introduced homogenization. Another limitation of the study is the exclusion of certain policies (such as carbon-taxation) as they "would already be represented in the energy price time series" (Ó Broin et al., 2015, 220 ). Yet, the amount of collected energy and carbon-taxes does not necessarily correlate with the size of the tax rate. Individuals will adjust their behavior and substitute taxed sources (e.g. coal and oil) in favor of non-taxed or lightly taxed sources of energy. Thus, for countries in which energy and carbon-taxes have been in effect for many years (e.g. Sweden), the carbon-tax revenue underestimates the full impact of tax based energy policies as oil and coal are no longer in use. In other words, if people have already switched to renewable energy sources a high carbon-tax rate is not necessarily mirrored in a high energy price index.
The studies discussed above (Filipini et al., 2014; Ó Broin et al., 2015) have made valuable contributions to the literature and it is noteworthy that regulatory measures impart effects on building energy consumption in both of these papers. We base our analysis on the contribution of these two studies and extend their approaches in order to solve some methodical limitations and obtain more precise results.
Quantitative Analysis
We employ a mixed-methods approach. Our quantitative analysis serves the purpose of explaining energy consumption by country and year by observable characteristics. We pay close attention to country specific effects as they can indicate a higher (or lower) level of energy consumption than what we would expect from the vector of observable characteristics. We also plot the country specific residuals over time. Systematic changes over time may indicate improvements or decline in energy efficiency. We then build upon these quantitative insights by qualitatively investigating certain countries, which stand out due to their better-than-expected energy efficiency, in detail. These case studies identify likely (policy) causes for their high levels of energy efficiency or efficiency improvements.
Having data of the 28 countries of the European Union and Norway for the years from 2000 -2015, we use panel data methods. The mean energy use per dwelling 4 by country and year (as tons of oil equivalent) represents the dependent variable in our empirical model which takes the following form:
In order to capture the country-specific effects a Least Squares (Country) Dummy Variable Model (LSDV) will be run. Therefore, a country dummy variable is included in the model controlling for time-invariant countryfixed effects. These country dummies show whether a country consumed more or less energy than others after having controlled for country-specific conditions. Using a LSDV can also prevent endogeneity caused by omitted variables since it captures all country specific effects. However, in this case we expect that the country specific effects mainly capture public policy differences across countries. It has been shown that cross country analyses often suffer from omitted variable bias (Ranson et al., 2014) . Both Filipini et al. (2014) and Ó Broin et al. (2015) include only a small set of controls. Besides the LSDV approach, we consequently add a number of additional variables, represented by , which plausibly affect energy consumption.
The vector is composed of the following time-variant explanatory variables: is the weighted average price index which calculates the energy price according to the country's specific energy mix and prices (including taxes and levies). Alternatively, we also used a net weighted average price index (excluding taxes and levies). However, due to a large number of missing values in the time-line and across countries, we did not include WAPInet in the model specifications.
Furthermore, the median age of the population, mean floor area and GDP per capita are included. All three are expected to have a positive impact on energy use. Their squared terms are included as well since we do not expect further positive impact on energy use from a certain floor area or GDP per capita onwards. Share of homes that are owned (as opposed to being rented) is included in the model in order to test for the existence of the owner-tenant dilemma. Moreover, the share of apartments (as opposed to free standing houses) is an important explanatory variable as apartments are more energy efficient due to the lower number of outer walls. In order to control for climatic differences we use , and as additional variables. are heating degree days which is a proxy variable for the country's specific climate, whereas captures possible effects related to continental climates in eastern European countries. The thermal properties of the building stock depend on its age. Therefore, we use the share of newly constructed residential buildings each year in conjunction with the share of buildings after 1980 in order to construct the variable 1980 for all years and all countries. We also included the country's average household size as an explanatory variable since we expect higher energy consumption with increasing household size. However, the household size does not vary substantially across countries and neither within countries over time. Besides, the variable household size was not significant and the regression output did not change substantially after the inclusion of the variable. Only the variable floor area lost some significance which could mean that the variable floor area partially captures household size. Therefore, the variable household size was dropped from the model. Finally, is the error term in this model.
The results of a Breusch-Pagan Test showed that the model contains heteroscedastic residuals. As often observed in panel data, we also detect autocorrelation. This is due to the country specific effects which are not constant over time. Therefore, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are specified in both model specifications.
Furthermore, energy prices are most likely affected by energy demand. In order to address this endogeneity problem Bigano et al. (2006) rely on lagged energy demand and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimations. Although a robustified Durbin-Wu-Hausman test on endogeneity led us to accept the null hypothesis of exogenous prices (WAPI tax), we nevertheless use an instrumental variable approach in order to safely rule out potential endogeneity.
To that end, the first year lag of the energy prices is used as an instrument for the energy prices. Energy prices were highly correlated with their lags and the lagged energy prices are not endogenous to the demand of energy. We use a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimator since it is more efficient than ordinary instrumental variable estimators (Cameron and Trivedi 2010) . In the first stage we regress the potentially endogenous variable WAPItax on the instrument and all exogenous variables. The first stage regression output shows that the instrument (L1.WAPItax) is statistically highly significant and its t statistic is relatively high. This confirms the use of our instrument. The second stage replaces WAPItax in the structural regression by the predicted values from the first stage regression.
The results of the second stage regression show that the negative coefficient is larger. This suggests that the negative effect of prices on energy consumption was underestimated by 6 percent in the original regression. As the standard errors are not substantially larger and the t statistics did not become smaller compared to the original model we can conclude that L1.wapitax is a strong instrument. The strong association between WAPItax and its first year lag emphasizes this. Furthermore, a Stock-Yogo weak ID F test defines the critical value to be 16.38 at a 10% maximal relative bias toleration. Since we have a minimum eigenvalue statistic of 90.86 and an F statistic of 25.77 (due to robust standard errors) we exceed the critical value of 16.38 and therefore, can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. By including exactly one instrument for one potentially endogenous regressor our model is just-identified. This is also proved by the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic which shows that our model is identified. Although WAPItax was not found to be endogenous, the estimates are still consistent.
Consequently, by conducting a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regression in the second model specification, reverse causality can be circumvented. With the inclusion of the instrumental variables the model takes the following form:
Where:
Where: 0
Data Sources
All variables, their sources, and basic descriptive statistics are displayed in table 1. The data for energy consumption per dwelling in tons of oil equivalent was obtained by the ODYSSEE-MURE website, which represents a collaborative effort by several European national energy agencies. The data is normalized to account for varying severity of winter weather conditions from year to year. ODYSSEE-MURE further provided the data on home floor space and heating degree days (HDD). The latter variable is defined as the distance between Temperature Tm and 18 degrees Celsius (weighted by the number of days), if outdoor temperature is 15 degrees or less and zero otherwise:
where:
We use both latitude and longitude as additional climate controls, whereby longitude controls for continental climates of eastern European countries. These variables were taken from the CIA fact book and verified with additional online sources. The median age is available at Eurostat. Home ownership and the fraction of the population living in apartments (for each country and year) are also available at Eurostat. However, these two variables do not contain values for each year, especially between 2000 and 2006. We graphically inspected the existence of a time trend in each country. If the slope is close to zero, it can be assumed that no systematic trend exists and the last available value was used for imputation. No more than three years of missing data was filled in in this manner.
The weighted average price index represents energy prices according to the country specific energy mix as well as country specific prices and taxes on each energy carrier. Therefore, the share of the main energy carriers (oil, coal, gas and electricity) 5 of the country's energy mix was calculated. Thereafter, prices of each energy carrier for each year were deflated to the prices of the year 2010 and denoted in USD. If the prices were only available in other currencies, the prices were converted into USD using the exchange rate of the respective year. To have a common base of measurement consumption of oil, coal, gas and electricity was converted into the unit tons of oil-equivalents using the IEA unit converter. In addition to this, different conversion efficiencies of the energy sources were considered, too. Therefore, the prices were multiplied by the energy carrier's conversion efficiency factor (NCV). Finally, the prices per ton of oil equivalent in USD and in NCV of one energy carrier (in one year) were multiplied by the carrier's share of the energy mix. Adding up these prices of each energy carrier yields the country and year specific weighted average price index. The data to construct this weighted average price index was drawn from ODYSSEE-MURE, Eurostat, IEA, OECD and Statista. 6 Data for GDP per capita and floor area were both drawn from Eurostat. In order to construct the variable share_post80 we use data on newly constructed residential buildings in each year and those constructed after 1980 drawn from the European Commission, ODYSSEE-MURE and Norway Statistical Offices. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and data sources. Age is only significant in model 2 and has, unexpectedly, a negative impact; its squared terms are not significant in either model. Floor area and GDP per capita and their squared terms are significant in both models. As expected, GDP per capita has a positive impact on energy consumption. However, a reverse trend is observable once a certain income is reached and less energy is consumed. Equally, increasing floor area leads to higher energy consumption up to the point at which floor area exceeds about 100 square meters after which consumption is decreasing again. This is most probably due to selective heating of rooms within a large dwelling. The share of owned homes does not affect the dependent variable. The tenant-owner-dilemma does not seem to be a major hurdle for the implementation of energy efficiency measures. The share of apartments affects energy demand negatively in both models. Similarly, the share of dwellings built after 1980 has a negative impact on energy use, albeit only in model 2.
Overall, our model's explanatory power is very high with an of around 0.983. This is due to the fact that the Least Squares Dummy Variable Models capture the effects of otherwise omitted variables. Coefficients of year and country dummies are not listed in table 2. A negative time trend is observable, which can be explained by technological progress as well as increasingly stringent European energy efficiency policies. Figure 2 depicts the country fixed effects sorted from least consuming to most consuming country. Country effects which were not significant have a coefficient of 0. Germany and France are left out as a control group and therefore have a coefficient of 0 as well. The country which displays by far the lowest energy demand is Sweden. The two countries which display the highest energy demand are Ireland and Luxembourg.
Our model results coincide with additional evidence. According to data by the International Energy Agency 7 , Bulgaria's residential energy consumption per capita is only about one third of Germany's, whereas Luxembourg requires 35% more energy than Germany. A study by the University of Luxembourg (Maas and Zürbes, 2007) also concludes that residential energy requirements are 30% to 40% above German and Swiss ones. 
Finland
Finnish re our regressio quantitative a following pa satisfactory, In comparison to Sweden and Finland, Ireland is underperforming when it comes to energy conservation in the residential sector. However, the descriptive data shows a 25% decline in residential energy use between 2000 and 2015. Thus, while Ireland displays poor energy performance on average, there have been considerable improvements during the last two decades. A rough calculation based on our regression coefficients suggests that at least one quarter of the overall decline in energy use between 2000 and 2015 can be traced back to the construction of new buildings. 9 The single most important policy measure seems to be the building part regulation in Ireland, which is currently comparatively strict.
The building part regulation was drastically tightened between 2000 and 2014. Table 4 shows its development over time. It applies to new buildings as well as to renovation for existent buildings, although in the former case, it is more demanding. Between 2000 and 2015, the building stock grew from 1.2 Mio. to 1.7 Mio. permanently occupied buildings. Therefore, a large portion of buildings is subject to the tightened regulations of 2002 and 2007. The average area per building grew during that period, but energy demand per dwelling declined (Irish Energy Agency, 2016) . The Irish Energy Agency explains this improvement by the increasing spread of central heating which is more energy efficient than space heating systems. , , p. 26 BRTGDL, 2017 3 All values are u-values. The unit is 4 BRTGDL = Building Regulations Technical Guidance Document L Carbon-taxation was introduced for heating and motor fuels in 2010. Its original rate was set at 15€ per ton of CO2, which was raised to 20€ per ton in 2012. Descriptive statistics show a marked decline in total energy use after 2010 despite the general increase in living space (Irish Energy Authority, 2016, 65-66) . While this may indicate an impact of carbon-taxation, the intervention is too recent in order to draw more definite conclusions.
The case of Ireland illustrates that hard building regulations are only effective in the long run. Because of the building boom, about a third of the Irish building stock was built after the year 2000, thereby being subject to current energy efficiency standards. Nevertheless, the average Irish energy consumption level is still higher than in most European countries.
Hypothesis 5:
Stringent building regulations are only effective in the long run. e e e n n a t y r n n r n y y y s d n comparison to Finland when it comes to energy consumption. We argue that this crucial difference can be found in high carbon-taxation rates that have existed in Sweden. The decline in the energy consumption pattern over time is consistent with such an explanation as the increases in taxation coincide with the decline but cannot be explained by the timing of building code reforms. In this regard the scope of carbon taxation plays a crucial role for its effectiveness. A carbon tax of only 4,50 € per ton of CO2 as in Latvia or 30 € per ton of CO2 in Finland cannot show the far-reaching effects as observed in Sweden (with a carbon tax of 120 € per ton of CO2). From our research, the following policy implications and hypotheses can be derived, which should be tested in future studies:
Latvia a
1. Strict regulations are effective in lowering energy consumption. 2.
Carbon and energy taxes are highly effective in improving energy efficiency. 3.
The prevalence of relatively efficient district heat systems has caused lower energy use. 4.
The effectiveness of carbon taxation is highly dependent on its scope. A tax of 30 € and a tax of 120 per ton of CO2 cause markedly different reductions in energy consumption. 5.
Stringent building regulations are only effective in the long run. 6.
Tighter regulations are most effective when followed by high construction activities in the residential sector. There are certain limitations to our approach. Most importantly, we have focused on generating hypotheses, not hypothesis testing. While our qualitative analysis leads us to argue that carbon-taxation can be an effective policy instrument for reducing energy consumption, quantitative efforts should test this assertion. As more and more countries introduce carbon-taxes, more data for such an endeavor will be available in the near future. In this regard, Lin and Li (2011) have already provided a valuable first contribution by examining the impact of carbon-taxation on overall CO2-emissions. Future studies should be careful to include the varying tax rates as our results indicate that the difference between a tax of 30 € and a tax of 120 € per ton of CO2 causes markedly different outcomes.
Furthermore, the use of the country specific effects as an energy policy indicator has two major limitations, one of which is the omitted variable bias. As above mentioned, the country dummies absorb the effects of omitted variables. Moreover, the country dummies could include cultural factors or habits in what concerns energy consumption. Further research could take upon these limitations.
Finally, while we cautiously suggest that both regulatory building standards as well as carbon-taxation can be effective policy approaches for reducing energy consumption, we have not addressed the cost-benefit aspects of these policies. There are strong theoretic reasons to believe that a taxation scheme will cause market actors to discover the most cost-efficient means of lowering CO2-emissions. If the cost of CO2-reduction exceeds a certain level, the likelihood of losing public support for further climate policies will increase, thereby jeopardizing global efforts to mitigating climate risks.
However, since we used an exploratory analysis we were able to shed some light on energy policies which were earlier neglected due to homogenization by quantification of energy policies. Therefore, our analysis provides useful policy implications for further enhancement of energy efficiency policies in the European Union
